報(bào)告題目: Alliance Formation Among Competitors
報(bào)告時(shí)間：2020年10月30日（星期五）19:00—20:30
報(bào)告地點(diǎn)：騰訊會議 ID：615 739 921
?。〞h鏈接：https://meeting.tencent.com/s/8JinxZ4c6wIg）
報(bào)告人：吳肖樂 復(fù)旦大學(xué)管理學(xué)院 教授
主講人簡介：
吳肖樂，復(fù)旦大學(xué)管理學(xué)院教授、博士生導(dǎo)師。2016年國家優(yōu)秀青年科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目獲得者，2020年國家杰出青年科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目獲得者。2006年本科畢業(yè)于清華大學(xué)工業(yè)工程系，2011年博士畢業(yè)于圣路易斯華盛頓大學(xué)。主要研究供應(yīng)鏈管理、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理、可持續(xù)性運(yùn)營問題。其研究工作發(fā)表于Management Science, MSOM，POM 等頂級期刊。曾獲中國管理學(xué)青年獎(jiǎng)（2017）、華人學(xué)者管理科學(xué)與工程協(xié)會最佳論文一等獎(jiǎng)（2011）、2016 MSOM Meritorious Service Award等。入選上海市曙光人才計(jì)劃（2016）、上海市教育系統(tǒng)巾幗建功標(biāo)兵（2020）。目前擔(dān)任頂級期刊POM 的Senior Editor、Service Science 和Modern Supply Chain Research and Applications 的Associate Editor。
Abstract：We study potential alliance formation among three competing firms with asymmetric capacity: one large firm has ample capacity, and two small firms have limited capacity. Each firm can either operate independently or form an alliance with another firm. Due to antitrust laws, an alliance of all three firms is not permitted. We first derive and compare equilibrium profits for different alliance structures in the base model where the size of loyal buyers for different firms is symmetric. By considering a standard equilibrium concept, we find that either no alliance will be formed or the large firm will form a ''mixed'' alliance with a small firm under conditions pertaining to the sizes of each firm’s capacity and loyal buyers. We explain how the equilibrium alliance structure is driven by the “price effect”and the “demand effect”. We also extend our base model to the case when the large firm has more loyal buyers than the small ones, and show that our structural results remain the same even though a ''small'' alliance with two small firms can emerge as the dominant alliance structure in some occasions.
